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I INTRODUCTION
Fifty-one years ago this week the Second World War ended. Shortly thereafter, Japan
experienced its second modern constitutional revolution. The first occurred in 1868 when
feudal leaders destroyed their own class system and unified the country under an
ahistorical, transformed Emperor institution. 1 Fifty years ago, Japan's parliament, the Diet,
was busy finalizing the present Constitution of Japan. That Constitution has been in effect
without amendment since May 3, 1947, making Japan's one of the twenty oldest of the
world's 181 single-document national constitutions. It has been the most trusted, respected
and legitimized of Japan's national institutions since its founding during the Allied
Occupation (1945-52).2
Because it rarely generates income or media hype, few legal scholars and practitioners
have noticed that over 130 of the world's constitutions have been ratified since 1970. Other
nations, like New Zealand, have been in the process of refining or rethinking their basic
law in recent times, or should be doing so, like the United States. With respect to human
* Fred Morgan Kirby Professor of Civil Rights, Lafayette College, United States of America.
1 On the development of Japan's modern law and first constitution, see Masami Ito in LW Beer
(ed) Constitutional Systems in Late Twentieth Century Asia (Seattle & London, University of
Washington Press, 1992) 129-174.
2 LW Beer "Constitutionalism and Rights in Japan and Korea" in L Henkin & A Rosenthal (eds)
Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad (New York,
Columbia University Press, 1990) 225-259; J Marshall Japan's Successor Generation: Their Values and
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rights provisions, the American Constitution is anachronistic and strangled in legalisms
without a coherent basis in constitutional principle; but the powerful legal fraternity, as in
lesser degree in other common law countries, will not allow adequate tampering with
ancient writ. The United States is based on three sacred writs: the Bible, the Declaration of
Independence, and the Constitution. Paradoxically, interpretations of the latter are at odds
with the other two documents due in part to the destructive intrusion upon the
constitutional culture of varied forms of laissez-faire capitalism since the nineteenth
century.
That admitted, what is more important and too seldom noted is that we live in the most
exciting period of world history with respect to dynamic, diverse and imaginative
experimentation with constitutional documents, as most nations converge on a relatively
few models concerning the essential institutions of modern statecraft and law. The level of
transcultural knowledge and mutual understanding achieved today in the global
professional community of law was unimaginable a mere century ago. Comparative
constitutional studies is now surely one of the most promising areas of legal research.
Among points of agreement with almost all of the world's nations is that a single-document
national constitution is close to essential. It is the best way ever devised to set out before
citizens and the world what counts most in a nation's coherent principles and structures of
law and government. Deviating from the consensus are a very few misguided states: the
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Israel, and three countries which count the Quran as their
constitution, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Oman. The contention of the few that a constitution
does not matter does not test out theoretically or empirically for most countries. New
Zealand's impressive Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993 are best seen not
as an alternative to a single-document constitution, but as sensible steps in a process
leading to a single comprehensive document expressing in refined form New Zealand's
aspirations and institutions for human rights constitutionalism.3
While a single-document constitution is essential and useful, it seems to be only part of
what should be understood as a nation's "constitution", even where such a document
provides a reasonably accurate guide to State behaviour. A more ecological definition of a
"living constitution" might be: a nation-state's written and unwritten principles and rules,
institutions and processes for organizing, exercising, and (in a genuinely "constitutionalist"
state) limiting governmental and community power on behalf of the primary public value(s)
of the country in a promulgated and reasonably predictable manner. Examples of such
foundational public values that have been suggested are: for Germany, human dignity; for
Canada, fraternity; for Australia, "the fair go"; for the United States, liberty and "the sale";
3 G Huscroft & P Rishworth Rights and Freedoms (Wellington, Brookers, 1995); P Spiller, J Finn & R
Boast A New Zealand Legal History (Wellington, Brookers, 1995).
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and for Japan, consensus. What might be most fundamental to the Kiwi constitutional
culture? What the distinctive emphasis?
Be that as it may, besides the most basic constitutional document, a nation's constitution
might be considered as including the enabling laws of branches of government, key judicial
decisions, Codes in civil law countries like Japan and other East Asian nations and other
documents accepted as seminal. For example, in New Zealand perhaps the 1840 Treaty of
Waitangi and the 1893 grant of female suffrage, shockingly deviant for its time, should
somehow be referred to in a New Zealand Constitution. This expanded notion of a living
constitution should lead us to a correspondingly broader than common understanding of
who are "the founders" of a nation-state and who "the authors" of a constitution. In what
follows, I would illustrate the above themes with the case of Japan in the past fifty years.
Japan's constitutional revolution AWAY FROM wartime (especially 1930-1945)
repressive authoritarianism, ultra-nationalism, aggressive militarism, and a state centred on
a quasi-divine Emperor AND TOWARD democracy, quasi-pacifism, and enforced and
promoted human rights began many months before the Constitution of Japan was
promulgated.4 The peaceful revolution began with directives (shirei) issued by Occupation
authorities to the Japanese government in September and October, 1945. Unlike post-
surrender Germany and liberated Korea which were governed directly by the Allied
Powers, Japan was indirectly ruled by the office of SCAP (Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers) through directives to Japan's leaders. These directives were called
"SCAPIN", and they were converted into Japanese law and policy by Japan. The so-called
"freedom orders" Uiyu no shirei), SCAPIN 66 and 93 of September and October 1945, forced
Japan's lame-duck government to end censorship and all repressive laws and police systems.
Thus, a few Occupation functionaries monitoring the government early in the Occupation
are among the "founders" of Japan's present constitutional system, because they served as an
essential catalyst instigating fundamental systemic change to a radically new but soon
accepted status quo. Analogously, the December 1945 House of Representatives Election
Law, which gave women 20 or older the right to vote for the first time, is a document of
constitutional importance and status.
The actual writing of the present Constitution of Japan began around February 3, 1946
after rejection by the US government and (SCAP) Gen Douglas MacArthur of cosmetic
changes in the Meiji Constitution 1889 which were proposed by Japan pursuant to the
surrender acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration (July, 1945). Led by Col Charles Kades
and two other attorneys, about twenty American civilian and military personnel wrote in
secret a draft constitution in about ten days, which was then substantially revised in
4 Beer, above n 2; LW Beer Freedom of Expression in Japan: A Study in Comparative Law, Politics, and
Society (Tokyo & New York: Kodansha International, 1984) 70-99.
18 (1997) 27 VUWLR
dialogue with Japanese in and out of government into the month of March. Over thirty
major changes were made by Japanese, then and later. The Constitution was not "imposed"
on Japan by the United States.
On April 6 a new House of Representatives was elected under the new election law of
the previous December. This was the most representative public body in Japanese history; it
freely debated, amended and then approved the Constitution of Japan by a vote of 421-8,
without American interference. Other "founders" were Japanese and Americans who
authored basic implementing legislation such as the Court Law (Saibanshoho) and the
democrarized Code of Criminal Procedure (Keijisoshoho). From that beginning to the
present, the Constitution of Japan (Nihonkoku Kempo) has been warmly welcomed by an
overwhelming majority of Japanese in its multi-document nature.5
Fifty years later, what is the record? How well has Japan observed the spirit and letter
of the Constitution of Japan? Imperfectly, of course; but in general and by comparative
standards of democracy, peaceable international relations, and human rights
constitutionalism, Japan's record is very good. Before suggesting a few key issues in
Japanese constitutional law especially worthy of foreign legal study, I would offer a few
facts too often overlooked by some foreign and Japanese critics of Japan. These facts
establish that Japan has been one of the most successful great powers in the world in the
past fifty years, perhaps the most successful.
First, no world power has been more peaceable in its international relations than Japan
under article 9, the "no war clause" of the "Peace Constitution". Remarkably, Japan has
never threatened or used physical force to settle international disputes.
Second, the Constitution is referred to as the "Peace Constitution", but it is as much a
"Freedom Constitution". Chapter 3, articles 11 to 40 guarantee Japanese a broad array of
individual rights and freedoms. Usually, these freedoms are honored in practice by the
government and taken for granted. Articles 14 and 24 granting equal rights for women went
well beyond even the progressive views of the "New Deal" Democrats among the
occupationnaires like Charles Kades. These women's rights provisions, which have guided
a radical improvement in women's status, are due to the improbable influence of Beate
Sirota, a 22-year-old college graduate, on both Japanese and American participants in the
constitution drafting on March 4 and 5, 1946. Incidentally, by reading Chapter 3 on rights
and duties you can get a good idea of American progressive thinking about individual rights
after the Second World War when idealism ran high (though not so high as to favour
5 On unsuccessful revision efforts, see LW Beer "Introduction: Japan's Constitutional Law, 1945-
1990" in LW Beer and H Itoh The Constitutional Case Law of Japan, 1970 Through 1990 (Seattle &
London, University of Washington Press, 1996) 12-18.
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constitutional protection of women's rights). After the great "Civil Rights Movement" of the
1950s and 1960s on behalf of African-American and other disadvantaged minorities, the
United States has unfortunately backed down from firm commitment to some rights in the
1980s and 1990s.
Third, Japan's superior prowess in many fields of endeavour (other than Olympic
sports) is well known. After the United States, Japan affects the world's economy and
technology more than any other country. Japan is the leading creditor nation, and the
leading provider of non-military foreign aid under the ODA (Official Development
Assistance) guidelines of the OECD (Organization for Economic and Cooperation and
Development). Japan's United Nations bills are second in size to America's, but unlike the
United States' bills, Japan's are paid on time.
However, a more legitimate test than wealth and prowess from the standpoint of
Japanese citizens and of comparative constitutional performance is the size of the gap
between the rich and the poor in a country. According to a number of studies, Japan shows
the smallest gap between the wealthiest 10% and the poorest 10% of its population.
Whatever the causes, in Japan this is seen as in conformity with requirements of article 25
of the Constitution,6 which establishes a right to "minimum standards of wholesome and
cultured living". Sadly, among the industrialized democracies, the income gap between rich
and poor is greatest in the United States.
Fourth, Japanese have enjoyed an uninterrupted chain of national and local elections
under democratic law since 1946, a record matched by relatively few nations anywhere.
In short, although Japan like the other most successful democracies has problems, her
record of conforming with the Constitution of Japan is good and merits serious study by
constitutional lawyers in other countries. Particularly noteworthy is that Japan has
successfully fused together a new creative synthesis of East Asian legalism, civil law,
common law, and human rights constitutionalism.
I respectfully suggest that you look carefully at the constitutional case law of Japan.
Well over 100 important judicial decisions are readily available in English, as well as
6 Article 25 of the Constitution of Japan:
All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and
cultured living.
2 In all spheres of live, the States shall use its endeavours for the promotion and
extension of social welfare and security, and of public health.
Article 26 establishes a right to free compulsory education, while articles 27 and 28 spell out
worker rights to organize and to act collectively. Beer & Itoh, above n 5, pp 653-665.
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explanations and analyses of many more cases not translated.7 The holdings of the Supreme
Court of Japan and other courts in exercise of their powers of independent judicial review
constitute the most authoritative statements in Japan on many global problems of the
world's second most influential country. The Supreme Court, along with the Constitution
itself, are Japan's most widely trusted national institutions; party politicians, other than
one's own parliamentary representative, are the least respected.8 Critics, sometimes
including myselt claim the courts are not vigorous enough at times in protecting rights by
striking down legislation or other official acts as unconstitutional. A few have exaggerated
the relevance and influence of the Cabinet for the independent courts. In fairness, two
factors might well be noted: Japan's system balances legal traditions of parliamentary
supremacy and judicial supremacy under a Constitution giving strong emphasis to both
individual and community responsibility for rights and freedoms. Second, Japan has a
Cabinet Legislative Bureau which monitors every phrase of every bill for constitutionality
before it goes to parliament for consideration. They rightly prefer to avoid constitutional
ambiguity during the legislative process. Such ambiguity would burden the courts with the
task of resolving controversial issues, as happens at times in the US Congress.
A second topic worthy of foreign study is the thought-provoking manner in which Japan
under article 9of the Constitution has adhered to a pledge to "forever renounce war... and
the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes".9 Japan's unique
7 Beer & Itoh, above n 5, Appendix 4 lists over 100 judicial decisions translated into English, with
holdings. See also J Mald (ed) Court and Constitution in Japan: Selected Supreme Court Decisions 1948-
1960 (Seattle & London, University of Washington Press, 1964); H Itoh & LW Beer The
Constitutional Case Law of Japan: Selected Supreme Court Decisions, 1961-1970 (Seattle & London,
University Washington Press, 1978); DF Henderson (ed) The Constitution of Japan: Its First Twenty
Years, 1947-1967 (Seattle & London, University of Washington Press, 1969); N Ashibe, L Beer & M
Itoh "Japan" in Beer, above n l; P Luney & K Takahashi (eds) japanese Constitutional Law (Tokyo;
University of Tokyo Press, 1993); H Itoh The japanese Supreme Court: Constitutional Policies (New
York, Markus Wiener Publishing, 1989); DM O'Brien To Dream of Dreams: Religious Freedom and
Constitutional Politics in Postwar Iapan (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1996); Beer Freedom
above n 4.
8 Marshall, above n 2.
9 Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a
means of settling international disputes.
2 In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the
state will not be recognized.
Beer & Itoh, above n 5, p 655.
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record is only partially explained by the geopolitical good luck essential to any realistic
scenario of quasi-pacifism in a great power. Japan's quasi-pacifism is an extraordinary
phenomenon and constitutes Japan's one original contribution to constitutionalist thought
and practice in world civilization. Japan has not fired a shot in anger since 1945, a radical
turnaround for the most aggressively militarist of non-Western powers in the previous half
century.
Japan's military budget is statistically large because of its enormous GNP; but with the
limit set at 1% of GNP, Japan is weak in East Asian military geopolitics, even compared to
Taiwan. Moreover, Japanese weaponry may not be exported, to Japan's considerable
economic loss. No nuclear weapons may be introduced, possessed or made by Japan under
policy since the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. The laws and Constitution of Japan contain
no provisions on making war or peace, and operate on a basic assumption that Japan is not
militarily threatened by any country. The hotly debated 1992 law enabling Japan's
participation in United Nations Peace-keeping Operations is severely restrictive. Only
with prior parliamentary approval of each mission may small numbers of Self-Defence
Force (SDF) members join in monitoring an achieved ceasefire; any breakdown of a ceasefire
triggers an immediate return to Japan. Even the constitutionality of the small and decreasing
air, land, and sea SDF is still questioned by the majority of Japan's constitutional lawyers
and by some politicians,10 but not by the great majority of Japanese. Polls indicate the
public supports the constitutionality of the SDF as long as it is small, helps in time of
natural disaster, and does not engage in fighting abroad. Over 80% of Japanese voice
support for the practical idealism of article 9 in 1996.
With the end of the Cold War and the colonial period, the world is in a messy
transitional time without much order. But this is also a time of exceptional opportunity for
many nations which have long lacked elbow room in their international relations due to
super power or colonialist pressures. Without undue optimism but also without a useless
and equally unrealistic cynicism, now may be the time for all nations to adopt a
constitutional provision renouncing war and the threat or use of force as means of settling
international disputes. Some nations are reexamining comprehensively their genuine
national security needs seeking a credible answer to the question: Which specific countries
pose a real military threat if any? Many nations like Japan define national security as
primarily dependent on social, economic, technological and ecological factors. The US-
10 Some constitutional lawyers allege SDF unconstitutionality on the technical grounds of reasonable
legal interpretation of the words of article 9; others oppose the SDF on both constitutional and
policy grounds; and still others do not find the SDF's existence constitutionally repugnant but
consider it unwise policy. A learned pacifist exposition is T Fukase Senso Hoki to Heiwateki
Seizonken (Renunciation of War and the Right to a Peaceful Lie) (Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1987). See
also J Auer "Article 9: Renunciation of War" in Luney & Takahashi, above n 7, at p 69.
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Japan Security Treaty contributes to Asian security, but Japanese and American
perceptions of issues and benefits diverge. Some countries need no purely military force,
many others need far less war potential than they have. Military politics distorts
constitutional politics in the US more than in Japan, but less severely than in Burma,
Indonesia, India, Pakistan and China. In Asia, the principal function of some militaries is
not defence, but maintenance of control and stability.
Finally, a third area of Japanese constitutional law and politics which has received and
warrants foreign study, for both the strengths and the weaknesses it reveals in Japan's
constitutional culture, is criminal justice rights.11 On the one hand, Japan is a very safe and
democratic place to live. The police are user-friendly and respected, perhaps most helpful in
giving directions at the police boxes in labyrinthine urban neighbourhoods. Japan's crime
rate is low and its prison population is very small. Its compassionate leniency and
emphasis on reintegration of offenders into the community are impressive under laws and
processes which are not suffused with vengeance and punishment. The training, dedication,
ability, and integrity of Japan's police, prosecutors, judges and attorneys are generally of as
high a level as any in the world. The overwhelming majority of suspects never go to trial, let
alone prison, in a great many cases despite ample proof of guilt.
On the other hand, there is a seminal problem of power balance and supervision among
police, prosecutors, and judges. Police and prosecutors dispose of many more cases than
judges, who thus by effect hand down convictions in almost all criminal cases. As the
system operates, prosecutors exercise a quasi-judicial function through a delay of
prosecution (kiso yuyo) technicality which commonly ends action in felony cases. Most
important perhaps, police, prosecutors, and even judges seem to place too great emphasis on
full and remorseful confessions, as the proper indicator of sorrow and intent to reform and
as the condition for leniency. The effect of this emphasis is heightened by severely limited
access to an attorney. A detained person does not have a right to an attorney until formally
indicted (kiso), and even then only for a limited number of short periods. The worst abuses
are thought to occur before indictment.
The case clearance rate in Japan is outstanding., but in a minority of cases police, with
judicial warrant routinely given but without careful prosecutorial monitoring, can keep a
person under interrogation for over twenty days in pursuit of an adequate confession,
without bail or attorney assistance. Detainees are often kept in "alternative detention
facilities" (daiyo kangoku; also called "substitute prisons"), and may be mistreated; a
proposal to require videotaping of all interrogations is not expected to be adopted. The
roles of judges and defence attorneys seem to need reemphasis. The spirit of the criminal
11 Beer & Itoh, above n 5, pp 25-29, 63-65.
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justice rights set forth in articles 31 to 40 of the Constitution is not yet adequately
honoured; that may be Japan's key constitutional problem in the 1990s.
Malapportionment was a major concern of many constitutional lawyers until the
historic election law reforms in 1994; a great discrepancy in the value of a vote in different
election districts had arisen.12 With respect to what are called "rights and freedoms of the
spirit" (seishinteki jiyuken), the freedoms of expression, assembly, association, religion,
academic research and university teaching, petition and protest, thought, conscience and
press have been vigorously enjoyed for over fifty years free of any noteworthy government
restraints in all but very few contexts. A few such exceptions have been the ban on door-to-
door vote canvassing, limitation on civil servant political activities related to voting, and
Education Ministry tampering with pre-1945 history in high school textbooks. In such
continuing national debates, the courts play a central role.13
As in any constitutional democracy, Japan's social culture contains some elements which
strengthen and other elements which weaken the status of human rights and
constitutionalism.14 A non-individualist groupism militates against authoritarian
leadership and assures coherent group advocacy of diverse interests. The powerful
emphasis on achieving consensus favours broad-based participation in debates, both
national and within in-groups; but once consensus is achieved, there is less tolerance for
dissent or for opposing groups.
Japan has proven to be impressively egalitarian in its socio-economic life. Small
minorities continue to experience occasional discrimination, as do women; but many of the
guiding elites have persistently worked to improve in these and other areas of concern, and
with notable successes. "Improve always" is not only a slogan of Japan's auto and computer
makers. It is the imperative of a constitutionalist people with a very low threshold of
tolerance for their country's mistakes or for the considerable international shame brought
on by poor performance in human rights, as with respect to criminal justice. In another fifty
years, new constitutional concerns willlikely replace those of the present, but we can hope
that Japan's freedom revolution and quasi-pacifism will continue, that single-document
constitutions will express further convergence in world community-building processes, and
that the communications revolution will ease useful development of comparative
12 On malapportionment, see Beer & Itoh, above n 5, cases 22,23 and 24 and pp 38-41.
13 Beer & Itoh, above n 5, cases 16, 17, 18, 36, 37 and 43, and pp 36-38, 44-49.
14 Beer Freedom above n 4, pp 100-128; L Beer "Freedom of Expression: The Continuing Revolution"
in Luney & Takahashi, above n 7, at pp 243-254; D Bayley Forces of Order: Policing Modern Japan
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991); VL Hamilton & J Sanders Everyday lustice:
Responsibility and the Individual in Japan and the United States (New Haven & London, Yale
University Press, 1992).
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constitutional studies. If so, it may not be too much to expect that Japan's constitutional law
will be as routinely mentioned in the course of legal education in New Zealand, Australia
and other world regions, as foreign civil law and common law have been studies in Japan in
the past fifty years. As the world's prime example of successful synthesis of radically
different traditions of law and constitution, surely Japan deserves global respect and much
more study in the dmerging multi-cultural age.
